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Perceptual categorization at the basic level is generally faster than categorization at more superordinate
or subordinate level [Rosch, E., Mervis, C. B., Gray, W. D., Johnson, D. M., & Boyes-Braem, P. (1976). Basic
objects in natural categories. Cognitive Psychology, 8(3), 382–439]. But, what does it mean to be fastest?
One possibility is that levels of abstraction that are categorized fastest are processed ﬁrst. In this vein, the
basic level is often considered the ‘‘entry level” into our knowledge about categories in the world [Jolic-
oeur, P., Gluck, M. A., & Kosslyn, S. M. (1984). Pictures and names: Making the connection. Cognitive Psy-
chology, 16(2), 243–275]. We tested this ‘‘fastest means ﬁrst” hypothesis by contrasting the time course of
basic- and subordinate-level categorization of objects in a signal-to-respond experiment. This method
probes subjects to respond at systematically varying points in time after the onset of the object. The time
course function relating performance to time is characterized by its onset, growth rate, and asymptote.
While basic and subordinate categorization differed signiﬁcantly in growth rate and asymptote, they
did not differ signiﬁcantly in onset. If a basic-level stage preceded a subordinate-level stage, we should
have observed a difference in onset. We conclude that fastest does not necessarily mean ﬁrst in percep-
tual categorization.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The human visual system allows us to rapidly and accurately
recognize objects in the world (Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996). At
a glance, we can detect that an object is there, categorize it as a
bird, or identify it as blue jay. An important and long-standing
question about object processing is when these different levels of
abstraction become available to the perceiver. Some of these per-
ceptual decisions are made more quickly than others (Rosch, Mer-
vis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). But does fastest mean
ﬁrst? Do certain perceptual decisions start earlier than others dur-
ing visual object recognition (Grill Spector & Kanwisher, 2005;
Mack, Gauthier, Sadr, & Palmeri, 2008; Palmeri, Wong, & Gauthier,
2004)?
Rosch et al. (1976) found that participants were faster at verify-
ing that objects matched labels at the so-called basic level (e.g.,
dog) than more superordinate (e.g., animal) or subordinate (e.g.,
beagle) levels of abstraction. The fastest level of categorization
was later termed the entry level by Jolicoeur, Gluck, and Kosslyn
(1984) to acknowledge that the level at which perceptual informa-
tion makes ﬁrst contact with a stored visual representation. For
many category members, ‘‘basic-level [categorization] occurs ﬁrstll rights reserved.
T.J. Palmeri).and is followed, some time later, by subordinate-level identiﬁca-
tion” (Jolicoeur et al., 1984, p. 270). Rosch et al. (1976) argued that
the advantage for the basic level arises because the basic level is
the level at which objects show the largest gain in structural sim-
ilarity independent of the perceiver; representations of basic-level
categories follow the natural correlations and divisions of features
found in objects and, as a consequence, are available ﬁrst during
recognition. Various factors can inﬂuence which level is fastest.
For example, atypical category members that are structurally dis-
similar to their subordinate counterparts can be categorized faster
at subordinate levels than the basic level (Jolicoeur et al., 1984;
Murphy & Brownell, 1985). Furthermore, for objects of perceptual
expertise (Tanaka & Taylor, 1991), subordinate-level identiﬁcation
occurs as quickly and as accurately as basic-level categorization.1
This has been characterized as an entry-level shift with expertise:
For novice categories, the basic level is the entry level, but for expert
categories, more subordinate levels become the entry level (but see
Johnson & Mervis, 1997).
But what does it mean for a particular level of abstraction to be
the ‘‘entry level”? One straightforward possibility is illustrated in
Fig. 1. In this simple box-and-arrow model, objects from novice1 For clarity and ease of prose, we often use the terms basic-level categorization and
subordinate-level identiﬁcation in this paper. In this sense of the terms, both
‘‘categorization” and ‘‘identiﬁcation” are categorizations, albeit at different levels of
abstraction.
Fig. 1. One possible descriptive model of basic-level advantage (top) and entry-level shift (bottom). Speed-accuracy tradeoff functions show the (exaggerated) hypothetical
time course of processing associated with novice and experiment categories according to such a model.
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the basic level (the entry level) before being categorized at more
subordinate (or superordinate) levels. Basic-level categorization
is faster than subordinate-level identiﬁcation because basic-level
categorization occurs before subordinate-level identiﬁcation begins
– fastest means ﬁrst. But for objects from expert categories or atyp-
ical objects, there is an entry level shift: Objects are categorized at
subordinate levels of abstraction without ﬁrst being categorized at
the basic level. As illustrated in Fig. 1, by this account learning
about expert categories and atypical objects creates special-pur-
pose machinery for rapidly recognizing subordinate categories that
bypasses an initial basic-level stage of processing.
Characterizing stages of visual processing with levels of catego-
rization has obtained some currency in visual cognition and visual
neuroscience. For example, Grill Spector and Kanwisher (2005)
contrasted the time course of object detection, basic-level catego-
rization, and subordinate-level identiﬁcation and observed the
very same rapid time course for detection and categorization com-
pared to identiﬁcation. These results suggest an early stage of im-
age segmentation that both detects that an object is there and tells
you what basic-level category the object belongs to. Subordinate-
level identiﬁcation takes place in a subsequent stage of processing.
However, many extant computational models of object recogni-
tion and categorization propose no such preliminary basic-level
stage. Instead, basic-level categorization and subordinate-level
identiﬁcation are perceptual decisions at the end of the line of pro-
cessing, not sequential stages of visual processing. For example,
exemplar-based models of categorization (Kruschke, 1992; Nosof-
sky, 1992) can account for both categorization and identiﬁcation
performance. In broad strokes, these models assume some initial
stage of perceptual processing that provides the perceptual repre-
sentation of an object. This perceptual representation activates
stored exemplars in memory according to their similarity to the
presented object, with perceptual dimensions more diagnostic of
category or identity contributing more to similarity than non-diag-
nostic dimensions. Stored exemplars are associated with basic-le-
vel categories or subordinate-level identities through weights
learned by Hebbian or error-driven learning rules (depending on
the particular model). A stochastic random walk decision process
at this ﬁnal decision stage accounts for both errors and variability
in response time (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Palmeri, 1997). In theparlance of neural network models, decisions about both category
and identity are made within the ﬁnal output layer, not in earlier
layers (Nosofsky & Kruschke, 1992).
A similar hierarchy of information processing is seen in other
models. One neural network model of object recognition (Joyce &
Cottrell, 2004) assumes that an object goes through stages of Gabor
ﬁltering, principal component analysis (PCA), and a neural network
mapping PCA representations onto category labels. Decisions about
basic-level category or subordinate-level identity are driven by
trained weights leading to units at the same ﬁnal output layer of
the neural network. Similarly, another neural network model of
object recognition (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2000) assumes a hierar-
chy of information processing that begins with low-level features,
moves on to view-based representations, object representations,
and ultimately to labels for category and identity. Like the other
models, perceptual decisions at different levels of abstractions
are instantiated at the same output layer of the network. Critically,
none of the current models postulate an explicit basic-level stage
of processing that precedes the subordinate and superordinate
stages. A basic-level advantage arises in many models because of
the greater level of structural similarity among basic-level category
members and the greater dissimilarity to other categories. If there
is truly a basic-level stage of processing – as suggested by some
interpretations of entry-level phenomena – then this would chal-
lenge many current computational models of perceptual categori-
zation and object recognition.
We attempted to unravel the time course of basic-level catego-
rization and subordinate-level identiﬁcation. Is basic-level catego-
rization a stage prior to subordinate-level identiﬁcation? If so, then
most models are wrong.
Speciﬁcally, we asked whether the onset of processing for basic-
level categorization occurs before the onset of processing for subor-
dinate-level identiﬁcation. Our ﬁrst experiment veriﬁed that basic-
level categorization is signiﬁcantly faster than subordinate-level
categorization for typical members of novice categories; by con-
trast, atypical members should be categorized as fast at subordi-
nate and basic levels. We then asked if fastest might also mean
ﬁrst. The second experiment used a signal-to-respond (STR) tech-
nique to examine the time course of basic-level categorization
and subordinate-level identiﬁcation. STR probes perceptual deci-
sions at various time points after the stimulus appears. Of particu-
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source of the basic-level advantage. If subordinate-level identiﬁca-
tion of novice categories is performed by a stage of processing that
begins only after basic-level categorization ﬁnishes (as illustrated
in top part of Fig. 1), then we should ﬁnd a delay in the initial onset
of subordinate-level decisions relative to basic-level decisions over
time.
In addition to testing participants on novice categories of ob-
jects, we also tested participants on faces. Faces provide an inter-
esting contrast category for two reasons. First, there have been
explicit suggestions that an initial stage of processing categorizes
a stimulus as a face prior to a stage that identiﬁes the unique indi-
vidual. This suggestion has been supported by time course mea-
sures using EEG (e.g., Anaki, Zio-Golumbic, & Bentin, 2007) and
MEG (Liu, Harris, & Kanwisher, 2002). So perhaps faces are like
common objects from novice categories. They are categorized at
the basic level as a person. Then in a subsequent stage of process-
ing they are identiﬁed uniquely. If that were true, then like novice
categories, during the STR task wemight expect a signiﬁcant differ-
ence in the onset of processing for basic-level categorization and
subordinate-level identiﬁcation of faces.
Second, others have suggested that normally-functioning adults
can be considered face experts (Carey, 1992; Carey & Diamond,
1994; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Tanaka,
2001), though whether face expertise is qualitatively different
from other forms of perceptual expertise is hotly debated (Bukach,
Gauthier, & Tarr, 2006; McKone, Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007). It
is true, however, that faces show qualitatively the same entry-level
shift as other categories of expertise. Speciﬁcally, pictures of highly
familiar faces are identiﬁed as quickly as unique individuals as
they are categorized as people (Tanaka, 2001), much in the same
way that for bird experts, pictures of birds are identiﬁed as quickly
at a subordinate level as they are categorized as birds (Tanaka &
Taylor, 1991). By this alternative account, during the STR task
we might expect no difference in the onset of processing for ba-
sic-level categorization and subordinate-level identiﬁcation for
faces.2 We also analyzed data for each individual bird and dog separately. In all but two
cases, typical objects were categorized faster at the basic than subordinate levels and
atypical objects were categorized at least as fast at the subordinate level as the basic
level. The only exceptions were owl, which showed response times like atypical
objects, and poodle, which showed response times like typical objects.2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
Fifteen Vanderbilt University undergraduates participated in
two 1 h sessions for course credit or monetary compensation.
2.1.2. Stimuli
Images of objects from three categories (faces, dogs, and birds)
were used. Each category consisted of about 320 images from eight
different subordinate-level categories: faces – Arnold Schwarze-
negger, Jennifer Aniston, Britney Spears, Nicole Kidman, George
W. Bush, Mel Gibson, Hillary Clinton, Bill Clinton; dogs – sharpei,
beagle, chihuahua, chow chow, golden retriever, german shepherd,
weimaraner, poodle; birds – robin, dove, crow, hawk, duck, pen-
guin, ostrich, owl. Two of the dogs (chihuahua and poodle) and
two of the birds (penguin and ostrich) are atypical members of
the category as deﬁned in previous work (Jolicoeur et al., 1984;
Rosch et al., 1976), the rest of the dogs and birds are typical. Images
were presented in grayscale and subtended approximately
5.2  5.2 of visual angle.
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from the com-
puter display and performed a speeded category veriﬁcation task.
Each trial began with a basic- or subordinate-level category labeldisplayed for 1000ms, followed immediately by the test image.
The test image remained on the screen until the participant re-
sponded. Participants responded by hitting a ‘‘yes” key if the label
matched the object shown in the test image, and a ‘‘no” key if it did
not. Half of the category veriﬁcations were made at the basic level
(face, dog, or bird), and half were made at the subordinate level
(Jennifer Aniston, beagle, robin, etc.). On true trials, the category la-
bel and the object in the test image matched. On false basic-level
trials, another basic-level category was shown (e.g., a label BIRD
for the image of a german shepard). On false subordinate-level tri-
als, another category label from the same basic-level category was
displayed (e.g., a label BEAGLE for the image of a german shep-
herd); for faces, the label on false trials was a person of the same
gender as the one depicted in the image. Participants were in-
structed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Before
the experimental trials began participants completed a short prac-
tice session; the practice stimuli were drawn from other basic-le-
vel categories. Each session consisted of 960 trials and lasted
approximately 1 h.
2.2. Results and discussion
Veriﬁcation response times and accuracy on true trials from
each of the object categories are shown in Fig. 2. A basic-level
advantage was found for birds and dogs, replicating Tanaka and
Taylor (1991), but not faces, replicating Tanaka (2001). Both the re-
sponse time and accuracy data were subjected to a within-subjects
domain (dog, bird, and face)  level (basic, subordinate) ANOVA.
Overall, responses were faster (F(2, 28) = 23.4, MSE = 2571,
p < 0.001) and more accurate (F(2, 28) = 4.48, MSE = 0.00024,
p < 0.05) for faces than dogs or birds, and responses were faster
(F(1, 14) = 23.3, MSE = 2330, p < 0.001) and more accurate
(F(1, 14) = 17.29, MSE = 0.00066, p < 0.01) for basic-level than sub-
ordinate-level veriﬁcations. Critically, signiﬁcant domain  level
interactions were observed for both response time
(F(2, 28) = 7.69, MSE = 1120, p < 0.01) and accuracy
(F(2, 28) = 8.91, MSE = 0.00029, p < 0.01). Planned comparisons
were conducted on the difference between the basic- and subordi-
nate-level veriﬁcations for each domain. For both birds and dogs,
responses were faster and more accurate for basic than subordi-
nate veriﬁcations [birds – RT t(14) = 4.01, p < 0.01, accuracy
t(14) = 3.93, p < 0.01; dogs – RT t(14) = 5.24, p < 0.001, accuracy
t(14) = 5.04, p < 0.001]. For faces, no signiﬁcant difference was
found for either response time [t(14) = 1.81, p = 0.203] or accuracy
[t(14) < 1.0, p = 0.87].
The above analyses included all birds and dogs, regardless of
their typicality. Not surprisingly, when we excluded the atypical
objects from the analyses conducted above, all of statistical con-
trasts were at least as strong (Table 1). We then analyzed the atyp-
ical objects separately (Table 1). For the atypical birds,
subordinate-level categorization was actually signiﬁcantly faster
than basic-level categorization [t(14) = 2.98, p = 0.01], with no sig-
niﬁcant difference in accuracy [t(14) = 1.02, p = 0.327].2 For the
atypical dogs, basic-level categorization was still signiﬁcantly faster
than subordinate-level categorization [t(14) = 4.19, p = 0.001] with
no signiﬁcant difference in accuracy [t(14) = 0.82, p = 0.424].
In addition to examining average accuracy and response times,
we also examined the full response time distributions for basic-le-
vel categorization and subordinate-level identiﬁcation. We were
speciﬁcally interested in the fastest tail of the RT distributions. If
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Fig. 2. RT and accuracy for speeded veriﬁcation in Experiment 1. Gray and white bars represent basic- and subordinate-level performance, respectively. Asterisks () represent
signiﬁcant differences (p < 0.05) between basic- and subordinate-level performance and error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Table 1
Average accuracy and RT in Experiment 1 for typical and atypical objects in each
domain. 95% conﬁdence intervals are shown in parentheses as well as signiﬁcant
differences between basic-level categorization and subordinate-level identiﬁcation at
p < 0.05 ().
Condition Accuracy RT
Typical
Bird Basic .982 (.951, 1.00) 572 (539, 605)
Subordinate .941 (.909. ,972) 647 (614, 680)
Dog Basic .982 (.965, .999) 563 (532, 595)
Subordinate .952 (.935, .968) 613 (581, 645)
Person Basic .969 (.957, .984) 544 (521, 566)
Subordinate .981 (.966, .993 553 (530, 575)
Atypical
Bird Basic .970 (.958, .983) 607 (581, 632)
Subordinate .980 (.967, .992) 568 (543, 594)
Dog Basic .972 (.944, .999) 564 (541,586)
Subordinate .961 (.933, .989) 608 (565, 630)
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est RTs, such that the fastest basic-level categorizations are faster
than the fastest subordinate-level identiﬁcations, this could pro-
vide some converging evidence for a basic-level stage preceding
subordinate-level processing.
To do this comparison, we created Vincentized (Ratcliff, 1979;
Vincent, 1912) RT distributions for basic-level categorization and
subordinate-level identiﬁcation, as shown in Fig. 3. Vincentizing
is a technique for creating an average RT distribution that pre-
serves the shape of the individual-participant RT distributions; it
is well known that if individual-participant RTs are simply piled to-
gether into a single group-deﬁned RT distribution, then the group
RT distribution can have a very different shape from any of the
individual RT distributions. Vincentizing ﬁrst creates a cumulative
RT distribution for each individual participant. At each quantile of
the distribution, the RT at that quantile for each individual RT dis-
tribution is averaged together. For Fig. 3, we chose a ﬁne-grained
Vincentizing at each 5% (1% for zoomed ﬁgure insets). The shaded
region is a conﬁdence interval on the Vincentized RT distribution
generated with a bootstrapping procedure.3 For typical objects,
even though the distributions for basic- and subordinate-level deci-
sions are separated over the bulk of the RT distributions, the separa-
tion for the fastest RTs is less clear. For atypical objects, we see a3 The conﬁdence interval was generated by creating 5000 Vincentized RT distri-
butions and setting the upper and lower bounds of the conﬁdence interval to the 2.5%
and 97.5% extent of a distribution of distributions. Speciﬁcally, we used a bootstrap
procedure whereby on each of the 5000 simulated runs, we created a RT distribution
for each participant by sampling their observed RTs with replacement, and then
created a sample Vincentized RT distribution using the same approach we used for
the actual sample of observed data.great deal of overlap in the RT distributions over their full extent.
We see a similar degree of overlap in the distributions for faces.
To summarize, for objects from novice categories, veriﬁcations
at the basic level were faster and more accurate than those at a
subordinate level. But for faces, there was an ‘‘entry-level shift”,
with comparable speed and accuracy at the subordinate level as
the basic level. Comparing RT distributions did not show clear evi-
dence for a difference in onset of correct responses for basic-level
categorization versus subordinate-level identiﬁcation. We further
explored the time course of categorization and identiﬁcation in
Experiment 2.3. Experiment 2
For novice categories, objects are categorized faster at the basic
level than subordinate levels. But are these objects categorized at
the basic level before subordinate identiﬁcation begins? Does fast-
est mean ﬁrst?
To answer this question, we contrasted the time course of cat-
egorizing expert and novice objects at basic and subordinate levels
using a signal-to-respond (STR) technique, or also called a response-
signal technique (Corbett & Wickelgren, 1978; Dosher, 1981;
Hintzman, Caulton, & Curran, 1994; Reed, 1973). This task can be
used to unravel the time course of visual object processing by sys-
tematically varying the amount of time a participant is given to
process a test object and measuring how categorization perfor-
mance changes as a function of processing time.
Another common technique for probing the time course of ob-
ject processing involves systematically manipulating the exposure
duration of images (rather than manipulating the time to make an
object decision). This is a useful technique, especially for under-
standing what kinds of perceptual decisions are possible at a
glance. One potential limitation is that, especially for very rapid
exposure durations, it is difﬁcult to disentangle the time-course
of processing per se from the quality of the perceptual representa-
tion being processing. If early visual areas need to temporally inte-
grate sensory information, then very rapidly presented images will
have a degraded sensory representation. By holding exposure
duration constant, we can focus our lens on the time-course of
decisions. For this reason, STR techniques are commonly used
when asking questions about potential stages of processing that
lead to those decisions (e.g., Hintzman & Curran, 1997).
We introduced a STR version of the category veriﬁcation task,
using the same collection of objects and categories. At systemati-
cally varying lags after the appearance of each image, we presented
a response signal (a tone) that instructed the participant to imme-
diately make a response. Speciﬁcally, the participant was in-
structed to respond within a short time window after hearing the
tone.
Fig. 3. Cumulative distributions of correct true trials in Experiment 1; basic-level categorization (solid line) and subordinate-level identiﬁcation (dotted line), shaded regions
represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. Insets zoom in on the fastest tail of distributions.
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us to examine how category veriﬁcation performance changes over
time.Fig.1illustratesthespeed-accuracytradeoff functions(SATF)that
are typically observed in STRparadigms. These curves canbe charac-
terized by their onset, the time at which categorization performance
begins togrowabovechance,growthrate, howsteeplycategorization
performanceincreaseswithincreasingtime,andasymptote, themax-
imum level of categorization performance possible.
Of particular interest to us are differences in onset for basic-le-
vel categorization and subordinate-level identiﬁcation. As illus-
trated in Fig. 1, if for novice categories the onset of subordinate-
level identiﬁcation requires completion of a basic-level categoriza-
tion stage, then there should be some window of time where
above-chance performance is possible for basic-level categoriza-
tion but not subordinate-level identiﬁcation – this would be re-
ﬂected by a signiﬁcant onset difference in the SATF. Of course,
the illustration in Fig. 1 exaggerates the onset difference we might
expect. But given that there was a 50ms difference between basic-
and subordinate-level decisions for novice categories in Experi-
ment 1, there is a potential opportunity to uncover signiﬁcant on-
set differences using a STR paradigm. Indeed, it is common to ﬁnd
signiﬁcant differences in the onset of speed-accuracy tradeoff func-
tions for a variety of simple decisions that can be made as rapidly
as the categorization decisions under consideration in this article,from lexicality and memory decisions (e.g., Hintzman & Curran,
1997; Hintzman et al., 1994) to categorization decisions (e.g., Lam-
berts, 2000; Lamberts & Freeman, 1999) to visual perceptual deci-
sions (e.g., Carrasco, McElree, Denisova, & Giordano, 2003).
Now as for faces, the previous research using MEG and EEG sug-
gests that we might expect to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant onset difference for
basic-level categorization versus subordinate-level identiﬁcation
(e.g., Anaki et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2002). On the other hand, Exper-
iment 1 showed no signiﬁcant difference in category veriﬁcation at
the basic and subordinate levels, so we might also expect to ﬁnd no
onset difference whatsoever.
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Five of the participants from the ﬁrst experiment took part in
this experiment and were paid $12 per session.
3.1.2. Stimuli
The same stimuli were used as Experiment 1.
3.1.3. Procedure
Participants completed a category veriﬁcation task like Experi-
ment 1, but with the inclusion of a signal-to-respond manipula-
1966 M.L. Mack et al. / Vision Research 49 (2009) 1961–1968tion. On each trial, a category label was displayed for 1000ms, and
then a premask was displayed for a variable duration, followed by
the presentation of the stimulus image for 200ms, followed by a
postmask. An auditory signal to respond was presented to the par-
ticipants after a variable lag (12, 24, 35, 47, 94, 188, 376, 753, or
1506 ms) from image appearance. Masking was used to limit the
amount of perceptual processing in order to make the task more
difﬁcult than unmasked viewing; note that the same limits from
masking were imposed at all signal-to-respond levels. As in Exper-
iment 1, participants veriﬁed the match or mismatch between the
category label (basic or subordinate) and object in the stimulus im-
age, but they could only respond after hearing the auditory signal.
A warning message was presented if the participants responded
before the signal or if the response time after the signal was smal-
ler than 180ms or greater than 350ms. Participants responded by
pressing keys marked as ‘‘yes” and ‘‘no” on a keyboard. Participants
completed 16 sessions with each session consisting of 864 trials
and lasting approximately 1 h. This resulted in 256 trials for each
lag in every domain (dog, bird, and person) and category label (ba-
sic or subordinate).
3.2. Results
Fig. 4 displays the average observed speed-accuracy tradeoff
functions in terms of discriminability (d0) as a function of process-
ing time for basic- and subordinate-level categorization of typical
and atypical (insets) objects in each of the three object domains.
In order to quantitatively compare the temporal dynamics of
speed-accuracy tradeoff functions, d0 values from individual partic-Fig. 4. Speed-accuracy tradeoff functions in Experiment 2; behavioral time course
data (close and open circles) and exponential curve ﬁts (solid and dotted lines) for
typical objects in each domain (atypical objects are shown in the insets).
Performance (d0) is plotted along the y-axis and response time plus lag is plotted
along the x-axis.ipants were ﬁtted with an exponential function widely used to
analyze STR data (Wickelgren & Corbett, 1977)
d0 ¼ kð1 ebðtdÞÞ;
where t is the lag until the response signal plus the response time
after the signal (i.e., t = signal lag + RT), k is the asymptote, b is
the growth rate, and d is the onset. The asymptote represents an ex-
pected maximum accuracy for the task given unlimited time; the
growth rate represents the rate at which relevant information is ex-
tracted; the onset represents when performance begins to grow
above chance during the time course of processing. By ﬁtting this
function to each participant’s data, we can statistically compare
the resulting parameters values (k, b, and d) for basic- and subordi-
nate-level categorization in each domain. If, for example, we ﬁnd
statistically shorter onsets for the basic than subordinate levels,
then this indicates a delay in initial processing of subordinate-level
categories, perhaps because subordinate-level categorization fol-
lows basic-level categorization.
After ﬁtting the exponential function to each individual partic-
ipant’s speed-accuracy tradeoff data, we conducted planned com-
parisons testing for differences in asymptote, growth rate, and
onset parameters between basic- and subordinate-level decisions.
Average values of the asymptote, growth, and onset parameters are
shown in Table 2. For typical objects from novice categories (birds
and dogs), no signiﬁcant difference was observed for the onsets
[t(4) < 1.0]. For birds, the growth rate [t(4) = 3.64, p = 0.003] was
signiﬁcantly higher for basic-level categorizations and the asymp-
tote [t(4) = 2.33, p = 0.079] was marginally higher for basic-level
categorizations. For dogs, a marginally signiﬁcant difference was
observed in asymptote [t(4) = 2.18, p = 0.094] with a higher asymp-
tote for basic-level categorizations. For faces, planned comparisons
revealed a marginally signiﬁcant difference in the growth rate
[t(4) = 2.59, p = 0.061]. Interestingly, a small but signiﬁcant differ-
ence in onset, t(4) = 4.53, p = 0.027, was observed, with the basic-
level condition having the shorter onset. For atypical objects, no
signiﬁcant differences were observed in any of the SATF parame-
ters [t(4) < 1].
In addition to simply ﬁtting the exponential functions to the
individual speed-accuracy tradeoff functions, we also tested
hypotheses by ﬁtting special cases of the function. Speciﬁcally,
we tested whether the onset for basic and subordinate decisions
was the same by constraining the onset to be identical for basic
and subordinate decisions but allowing the growth rate and
asymptote to vary. We contrasted the ﬁt of the ‘‘full model”, with
three parameters for basic and three parameters for subordinate,
with a ‘‘restricted model”, with a common onset parameter forTable 2
Average best ﬁtting parameters from the basic-level categorization and subordinate-
level identiﬁcation SATF for typical and atypical objects in each domain. Signiﬁcant
differences between parameters for basic-level categorization and subordinate-level
identiﬁcation are labeled at p < 0.05 () and p < 0.10 ().
Condition Parameters
Asymptote Growth rate Onset
Typical
Bird Basic 4.67 10.51 0.272
Subordinate 3.95 6.07 .0267
Dog Basic 4.76 10.91 0.273
Subordinate 4.46 8.23 0.273
Person Basic 4.88 11.25 0.228
Subordinate 4.89 6.46 0.272
Atypical
Bird Basic 4.10 11.42 0.279
Subordinate 4.29 9.03 0.282
Dog Basic 4.181 9.21 0.269
Subordinate 4.17 8.90 0.283
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parameters for basic and subordinate. If the restricted model with
a common onset ﬁts signiﬁcantly worse than the full model, we
can reject the hypothesis that the onset is the same for basic-
and subordinate-level categorizations. Following Dosher (1981),
the quality of the ﬁtted models was assessed using an R2 statistic
that represents the proportion of variance accounted for by the
model and was adjusted by the number of free parameters in the
model. Model comparisons are based on the direct comparison of
the R2 values with higher R2 values indicating better accounts of
the observed data. For typical objects from novice categories (birds
and dogs), the restricted models with equal onsets ﬁtted as well as
the full model where onsets could be different (for birds, average
R2 was .948 for the full model and .957 for the restricted model;
for dogs, average R2 was .912 for the full model and .932 for the re-
stricted model). For faces, the restricted model with equal onsets
(average R2 = .858) ﬁtted as well as the full model with unequal on-
sets (average R2 = .861). Fits of the SATF for atypical objects
showed similar results as for typical objects, with the restricted
model ﬁtting as well as the full model for both atypical birds (full:
R2 = .928, restricted: R2 = .934) and atypical dogs (full: R2 = .873, re-
stricted: R2 = .897).
3.3. Discussion
For the novice categories, even though basic-level categoriza-
tion was faster and more accurate than subordinate-level identiﬁ-
cation in Experiment 1, there was no signiﬁcant delay in the onset
of subordinate-level identiﬁcation compared to basic-level catego-
rizations in the STR task. Basic-level categorizations may be made
faster than subordinate-level identiﬁcation, but basic-level catego-
rization does not appear to be a stage of processing that precedes
subordinate-level identiﬁcation.
One potential concern could be that we failed to muster sufﬁ-
cient statistical power to detect signiﬁcant differences in the onset
when the exponential functions were ﬁtted to the observed data.4
In fact, we were able to observe a small but statistically signiﬁcant
onset difference of only 27 ms for faces. This onset effect is one half
the size of the basic-level advantage in response time we observed in
the ﬁrst experiment. This suggests that we had sufﬁcient statistical
power to detect a putative onset difference with dogs and birds.
Turning now to the signiﬁcant onset difference with faces, recall
that the stage model outlined in Fig. 1 predicts an onset difference
for novice objects, with little or no onset differences for expert cat-
egories. That is clearly not what we found. So why might basic-le-
vel categorizations of faces show an earlier onset than
subordinate-level identiﬁcation of faces? Perhaps a face is ﬁrst cat-
egorized as a ‘‘face” before it is identiﬁed uniquely. Indeed, this
stage-like processing of faces has been suggested by some (e.g.,
Anaki et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2002). It is surprising, however, that
such stage-like processing would be found for faces, which do
not show any basic-level advantaged in speeded categorization,
and not for objects from novice categories, which do show a ba-
sic-level advantage. Perhaps this is a special property of face pro-
cessing that is not true for other categories of object.
Alternatively, it may be that basic-level categorization – is there
a ‘‘face” in the image? – could be driven by low-level image proper-
ties available very early in visual processing. It is known that peo-4 We also conducted another experiment that used essentially the same stimuli
and procedures and observed qualitatively the same results for non-face objects. The
only difference between that study and the one reported here is that we did not
include as many response signal delays, especially at the longer times; this gave us
more trials per condition. However, while long response signals are unimportant for
our primary question about the onset of the SATF, data from those long response
signals is important for getting adequate ﬁts of the asymptote parameter of the SATF,
which is why we reported the present study instead of this one.ple can rapidly categorize based on perceptually salient features
and that such salient features are often available before less salient,
but potentially more diagnostic features (e.g., Lamberts, 2000). To
gain some further insight into this puzzling result, we averaged to-
gether all of the face images, bird images, and dog images without
controlling for viewpoint differences across the images. For face
images, this average was roughly an oval face contour. The average
of the bird images and dog images did not look like a bird or a dog
or any other clearly identiﬁable basic shape. Further research is
necessary to completely understand this phenomenon (e.g., are on-
set differences found with face stimuli that include more variable
viewpoints?). What is clear, however, is that non-face (non-expert)
objects did not show any stage-like processing effects in the speed-
accuracy tradeoff function.4. General discussion
For novices, objects are categorized faster at the basic level than
at more subordinate levels (Rosch et al., 1976). Jolicoeur et al.
(1984) noted that such data are consistent with a model where ob-
jects must ﬁrst be categorized at the basic level before they can be
categorized at coarser or ﬁner levels, speculating that ‘‘every object
has one particular level at which contact is made ﬁrst with seman-
tic memory” (p. 272). According to this view, basic-level categori-
zation is fast because it is the ‘‘entry level” into semantic
knowledge. In other words, basic-level categorization is fast be-
cause it is completed before other stages of categorization can be-
gin. Interestingly, the difference between basic-level
categorization and subordinate-level identiﬁcation typically disap-
pears with expertise (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Tanaka & Taylor,
1991). This has been characterized as an ‘‘entry-level shift”, where-
by expert objects and atypical objects can be identiﬁed at a subor-
dinate level without ﬁrst being categorized at the basic level.
This stage-like view of visual object processing is implicit in
some writings and has been explicitly suggested recently by Grill
Spector and Kanwisher (2005). They contrasted the time course
of object detection, basic-level categorization, and subordinate-le-
vel identiﬁcation by systematically varying the exposure duration
of images in the experiment. Performance on subordinate-level
identiﬁcation was signiﬁcantly worse than object detection and
basic-level categorization at all exposure durations, but perfor-
mance on object detection and basic-level categorization was iden-
tical. Their conclusion was stated in the paper’s subtitle, ‘‘As soon
as you know it is there, you know what it is.” They suggested that
image segmentation – detecting that an object is there – and basic-
level categorization – knowing what it is – could be intimately
linked as a stage of visual processing prior to subordinate-level
identiﬁcation. The tight temporal coupling between object detec-
tion and basic-level categorization has been decoupled in recent
work (Bowers & Jones, 2008; Mack et al., 2008). The present work
examined the temporal relationship between basic-level categori-
zation and subordinate-level identiﬁcation.
Our experimental results argue against any stage-like process of
basic-level categorization preceding subordinate-level identiﬁca-
tion. While categorization of typical objects from novice categories
is faster at the basic level than the subordinate level in a speeded
category veriﬁcation task, no qualitative difference was observed
in the time course of decisions in a signal-to-respond paradigm.
Speciﬁcally, there was no observed delay in the onset of the
speed-accuracy tradeoff function for identiﬁcation relative to
categorization.
As we noted in the introduction, many computational models of
object recognition and object categorization assume no stage-like
processing architecture (Joyce & Cottrell, 2004; Lamberts, 2000;
Nosofsky & Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Palmeri,
1968 M.L. Mack et al. / Vision Research 49 (2009) 1961–19681997; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2000). But if that is the case, why are
subordinate-level identiﬁcations slower than basic-level categori-
zations in novice domains? And what happens when this differ-
ence goes away, as in expert domains or with atypical objects? In
many models, basic-level categorization and subordinate-level
identiﬁcation are both perceptual decisions at the same stage of
processing (Palmeri & Cottrell, 2008; Palmeri & Tarr, 2008). Some
models explicitly propose that these perceptual decisions are made
in prefrontal cortex (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2000) or other brain
areas (Ashby, Ennis, & Spiering, 2007) but that they are not made
in visual cortex (Jiang, Bradley, Rini, Zefﬁro, VanMeeter, & Riesenh-
uber, 2007). The speed of these perceptual decisions can be inﬂu-
enced by a variety of factors, such as the speed of perceptual
processing (Lamberts, 2000), the ease or difﬁculty of discrimina-
tions (D’Lauro, Tanaka, & Curran, 2008), or the quality of the visual
representations used to drive those perceptual decisions (Palmeri
et al., 2004).
Indeed, in other work, we are exploring how one model of ob-
ject categorization, the exemplar-based random walk (EBRW)
model (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Palmeri, 1997), accounts natu-
rally for both the basic-level advantage for novices and the en-
try-level shift with expertise, without assuming stage of
processing for the basic level or any qualitative change in represen-
tations over learning (Mack, Wong, Gauthier, Tanaka, & Palmeri,
2007; see also Palmeri et al., 2004). Models like EBRW do not pro-
pose any qualitative reconﬁguration with learning. Instead they as-
sume gradual quantitative changes – a sharpening of
representations over time (see also Jiang et al., 2006; Jiang et al.,
2007). Yet these quantitative changes can give rise to qualitatively
different patterns of results across novice and expert categoriza-
tion (see also Joyce & Cottrell, 2004). Faster categorization is pre-
dicted without assuming different stages of processes. Fastest
does not necessarily mean ﬁrst.
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